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Revocation in sensor networks is a challenging problem because asymmet-
ric key cryptosystems are unsuitable for use in resource constrained sensor
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Distributed Sensor Networks (DSN) are ad-hoc networks that consist of a
large number of low-power sensor nodes that communicate in short distances
through wireless links [16]. Sensor networks are used for a wide range of ap-
plications like health monitoring, data acquisition in adverse environments
and military operations. The desirable features of sensor networks have at-
tracted many researchers to develop protocols and algorithms that can fulfill
the requirements of these applications [11, 5, 13, 8, 1].
Sensor nodes may be deployed in hostile environments and thus, are sus-
ceptible to capture by an adversary. Node capture must be detected and
the captured node must be revoked. This involves prompt termination of
all forms of communication with a captured node. There are two forms of
revocation namely - centralized and distributed revocation.
In the case of centralized revocation, a controller node or base station
broadcasts a single revocation message containing a signed list of nodes to
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revoked. Upon receiving the message, the other nodes in the DSN revoke the
appropriate nodes.
Centralized revocation has the following advantages: (1) Non- circum-
ventable (2) No need for node-to-node message authenticity (3) Revocation
policy is uniformly enforced.
Centralized revocation has the following disadvantages: (1) Single point
of failure (2) Slower than distributed revocation (3) Needs global revocation
message
Although the single point of failure can be eliminated by revoker repli-
cation, the last two disadvantages cannot be easily removed. This requires
revoking nodes in a distributed fashion. An example of a distributed revoca-
tion scheme was proposed by Chan, Perrig, and Song [12]. In their scheme,
nodes that have a shared key with the node to be revoked, vote on the de-
cision to revoke. Upon registering a threshold number of votes, the voting
nodes revoke the concerned node. We illustrate the complexity of distributed
revocation using this scheme.
1.1 Organization
This thesis is organized in five chapters. In the first chapter, we define what
Mobile ad-hoc networks and DSNs are, and present some inherent problems
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in DSNs that make it impossible to implement traditional public key cryp-
tography solutions. The second chapter introduces revocation in DSNs and
presents prior work on centralized and distributed revocation. In the third
chapter our approach to distributed revocation in DSNs is explained. We
then introduce a new revocation scheme based on threshold cryptography.
In the fourth chapter, we evaluate the correctness of this new scheme in the
context of its resilience to the identified problems with prior distributed re-
vocation schemes. We define the notion of node degree tracking and explain
why degree tracking could be a limiting factor in achieving distributed revo-
cation. The final chapter concludes this work and presents possible future
work.
1.2 Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET)
Ad-hoc networks are a new wireless networking paradigm for mobile hosts.
Unlike traditional mobile wireless networks, ad-hoc networks do not rely on
any fixed infrastructure. Instead, hosts rely on each other to keep the network
connected. Military tactical and other security-sensitive operations are still
the main applications of ad-hoc networks, although the unique properties of
ad hoc networks pave way for its commercial usage [26].
Ad-hoc networking refers to the spontaneous formation of a network of
3
nodes without the help of any infrastructure, usually through wireless com-
munication channels [15]. In MANETs, in addition the nodes are also mobile.
The infrastructure in a MANET is thus highly dynamic not only because of
mobile nodes, but also because of the lack of guaranteed node connectivity.
This lack of guaranteed connectivity is caused by the limited-range, poten-
tially unreliable wireless communication that is characteristic of MANETs.
1.3 Distributed Sensor Networks (DSN)
DSNs are a special type of MANETs, with nodes that have limited compu-
tational and communication capabilities. These networks are dynamic in the
sense that they allow the addition and deletion of nodes after deployment.
Nodes are typically added to increase network size or to replace failing and
unreliable nodes. In a DSN, nodes can communicate only with other nodes
within wireless communication range. These nodes are said to form a neigh-
borhood. In the Figure 1.1 we show an example a neighborhood.
DSNs are typically used for data acquisition in tasks such as health moni-
toring, military operation, etc. Sometimes confidentiality of communications
between sensor nodes may be desired; e.g., when DSNs are used in military
applications to collect information about tank positions or troop movements.
Distributed sensor networks are, in such cases, a mission critical component
4
Figure 1.1: A neighborhood in a DSN
requiring commensurate communications security protection. Military equip-
ment and personnel must be assured that received sensor information is cor-
rect. Deployed sensors must only accept legitimate queries, commands, and
software updates. Sensor network communications must prevent disclosure
and undetected modification of exchanged messages.
Confidentiality, integrity, and authentication services are critical to pre-
venting an adversary from compromising the security of a distributed sensor
network. Cryptography is an essential mechanism for protecting sensor com-
munication and key management is likewise critical to establishing the keys
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necessary to provide this protection [16]. However, providing key manage-
ment can be a complex task due to the ad-hoc nature, intermittent connec-
tivity, and resource limitations of the sensor network environment [9]. If a
sensor network is deployed via random scattering (e.g. from an aerial ve-
hicle), the sensor network protocols cannot know beforehand which nodes
will be within communication range of each other after deployment. Even if
the nodes are deployed by hand, the large number of nodes involved makes
it costly to pre-determine the location of every individual node. Hence, a
security protocol should not assume prior knowledge of which nodes will be
neighbors in a network [12].
A number of key distribution and management schemes have been pro-
posed [16, 12, 25, 6, 7, 22] to satisfy both operational and security require-
ments of sensor networks. If the sensor nodes are deployed in hostile regions,
they are susceptible to be captured by an adversary. These captured nodes
can be used by adversary for a number of malicious reasons like false data
injection, launching DoS (denial of service) attacks to deplete network re-
sources etc. Thus, upon capture detection, these compromised nodes have
to be revoked.
Typically revocation involves termination of communication with the cap-
tured node. The limited computation and power resources of sensor nodes of-
ten makes it undesirable to use public-key algorithms, such as Diffie-Hellman
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key agreement [24] or RSA signatures [20]. Currently, a sensor node may
require in the order of tens of seconds up to minutes to perform these oper-
ations [9]. This exposes a vulnerability to denial of service (DoS) attacks by
sensor battery exhaustion [12]. Such resource consuming attacks are espe-
cially significant in DSNs [9]. Hence, in the absence of conventional public





In this chapter we present and analyze prior work on revocation in sensor
networks. We specifically examine two schemes that propose methods for per-
forming centralized [16] and distributed revocation [12]. Finally, we perform
a detailed analysis of the distributed revocation scheme proposed in [12], and
present inherent problems associated with any distributed revocation scheme
for DSNs in general.
2.1 An Approach to Centralized Revocation
In this section we outline the scheme proposed Eschenauer and Gligor in [16].
In DSNs due to the absence of a centralized KDC (Key Distribution Center)
[3], limited resources and computational capabilities, keys are generally pre-
distributed. On deployment, the sensor nodes discover their neighbors; i.e.,
nodes that share a key with them, and establish secure communication links.
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2.1.1 The Probabilistic Key Distribution Scheme
The probabilistic key distribution scheme relies on probabilistic key sharing
between nodes of a random graph and uses a simple shared-key discovery
protocol for key distribution, revocation and node rekeying. Prior to the
deployment, a ring of keys are distributed to each sensor node. Each key
ring consists of k keys randomly drawn without replacement from a random
pool of P keys, which is generated offline. Along with the keys, key identifiers
are also loaded into the sensors.
In the shared key discovery phase, every node discovers its neighbors in
wireless communication range with which it shares keys. Each node broad-
casts the key identifiers in its key ring unencrypted. Nodes that share a key
can then perform a cryptographic handshake.
2.1.2 Revocation
Whenever a sensor node is captured, it is essential to be able to revoke the
entire key ring of the node. For this, there is a controller node or a centralized
node(which has a large communication range and may be mobile) broadcasts
a single revocation message containing a signed list of k key identifiers to be
revoked. To sign the list of key identifiers, the controller node generates a
signature key, Ke and unicasts it to each node with Kci, where Kci is the
9
Figure 2.1: Controller node sends out Revocation message (Key Ids in Key Ring of Node
3) MAC-ed with Ke. MAC key Ke is send encrypted in Kci.
key shared by the ith controller with each sensor node during pre-distribution
phase. For example, the controller node could sign the list of key identifiers by
computing a MAC (Message Authentication Code) [21] with Ke and send Ke
encrypted in Kci. We illustrate this example in Figure 2.1 . After obtaining
the signature key, each node verifies the signed list of key identifiers and
deletes the appropriate keys from the key ring. Once the keys are removed
10
from the key ring, links with the compromised node disappear.
2.1.3 Summary
The scheme proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor in [16] is an example of
centralized revocation. Centralized schemes have the following advantages:
• Non-Circumventable: As the revocation message is unicasted by a re-
liable controller node, and the message can be verified by all the sen-
sor nodes in the DSN, the revocation of a compromised node is non-
circumventable.
• No need for node to node authenticity: As revocation message is uni-
casted with a signature key distributed securely to all nodes by a cen-
tralized controller node, there is no need for node to node authenticity.
• Revocation policy is uniformly enforced: As there is controller node
that acts as a centralized point of decision making revocation policy is
uniformly enforced.
Centralized Revocation has the following disadvantages:
• Single point of failure: Due to the inherent nature of centralized schemes,
compromise of a single controller node can completely defeat revocation
of numerous compromised nodes in a network.
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• Slower than Distributed Revocation: Due to the large number of uni-
casted messages, centralized revocation is slower than distributed re-
vocation schemes.
• Needs Global Revocation Message: The design of the scheme enforces
the necessity of a global revocation message that may add to the com-
munication overhead of the network.
2.2 Distributed Revocation
In the key pre-distribution scheme presented thus far, while each node could
verify that some of its neighbors had certain secret keys and thus were legit-
imate nodes, no node could authenticate the identity of the neighbor it was
communicating with. The random-pairwise key scheme proposed by Chan,
Perrig and Song [12] provides the property of node to node authentication for
a network that consists of nodes that do not trust each other. Note that this
property is useful for supporting numerous security functions. For example,
if a node detects that one of its neighbors is captured, it may be necessary
for the node to know the identity of the compromised neighbor. Also, with
node to node authentication, nodes can keep track of the identities of their
neighbors and can thus prevent an adversary from replicating in a network.
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2.2.1 The Random-Pairwise Key Distribution Scheme
In a network with n nodes, a simple solution to key pre-distribution problem
is that each node stores n − 1 pairwise keys. This however leads to an
undesirable increase in memory overhead.
The random-pairwise scheme is a modification of the above pairwise
scheme based on the observation that not all n − 1 keys need to be stored
in a node to have a connected random graph with high probability. If p is
the smallest probability that two nodes are connected, such that the entire
graph is connected with a probability c , then to achieve this probability
p in a network of n nodes each node needs to store only np keys instead
of exhaustively storing all n-1 keys. Reversing the calculation, if each node
in the sensor network can store m keys then, the largest possible connected
network is of size m
p
In the pre-deployment initialization phase a total of n = m
p
unique node
identities are generated. The actual size of the network may be smaller
than n. Unused node identities are used if additional nodes are added to
the network in the future. Each node identity is matched up with m other
randomly selected distinct node IDs and a pairwise key is generated for each
pair of nodes. The key is stored in both nodes’ key rings, along with the ID
of the other node that also knows the key.
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In the post-deployment key-setup phase, each node first broadcasts its
node ID to its immediate neighbors (i.e., nodes within wireless communica-
tion range). By searching for each others’ IDs in their key rings, the neigh-
boring nodes can tell if they share a common pairwise key for communication.
A cryptographic handshake is then performed between neighbor nodes who
wish to mutually verify that they do indeed have knowledge of the key.
2.2.2 Revocation
To reduce the disadvantages associated with a controller dependent revoca-
tion protocol, Chan, Perrig, Song [12] describe a distributed node revocation
scheme for the random pairwise scheme.
An outline of their scheme is as follows: Consider a node B, which, like
every other node in the network, has m keys in its key ring. Since all the keys
are issued to exactly two nodes and no two keys are issued to the same pair
of nodes, we have exactly m nodes that share a pairwise key with node B.
This set of m nodes are called the set of voting members of B. Each of these
m voting members are assigned a random voting key ki. Each voting member
also knows the respective hashes of the voting keys of all the m-1 other voting
members; i.e., all hash(kj), j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Hence, if m pairwise keys are
stored on the node, the node stores m− 1 hash values of the corresponding
14
Figure 2.2: Voting scenario to effect revocation of node 3
voting keys, for each of these m neighbors. To cast a public vote against B,
the voting member broadcasts ki in clear(unencrypted). All voting members
can verify the vote by computing hash(ki). If threshold t number of valid
votes have been heard, a voting member deletes the shared key (with the
node B) and thus revokes node B. Figure 2.2 illustrates the voting process for
revocation. As a consequence, if a node cannot form at least k*t connections
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(where k is some small multiple, e.g. 2); i.e., if a node has less than k*t
neighbors at key setup phase then, that node is automatically revoked (for
example; the node self destructs).
To prevent widespread release of revocation keys by compromised nodes,
the scheme requires that only nodes that have established direct commu-
nication with some node B have the ability to revoke B. This is done by
distributing the revocation keys to the voting members of B in a deactivated
form, i.e. each voting member j stores its revocation key for B, kBj masked
(XORed) with some secret SBj. This deactivated key will not hash to the
correct verifying value and is thus useless for voting. Node B knows all the
activation secrets SBj; 1 ≤ i ≤ m. During the key discovery and setup phase,
if node j wishes to complete key setup with node B, it requires node B to
transmit its activation secret SBj (and viceversa). Once node j has received
SBj it unmasks kBj using SBj, and verifies that it was given the correct un-
masking secret by performing vote verification on the unmasked kBj to see
if it is a valid revocation key. Such a policy of need-to-know based, key acti-
vation ensures that the majority of revocation keys recovered through node
capture are in an unusable masked state. In order to use these revocation
keys to revoke some node B the adversary now has to physically communicate
with B and complete key-setup for up to t new connections.
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Degree Counting Mechanism
To limit the amount node replication possible on the network, the degree of
any node can be limited [12]. This implies that we can limit the degree of
nodes to dmax, without disrupting network connectivity. The operation of the
degree counting scheme is exactly identical to the voting mechanism. Each
node contains a voting key and some way to verify valid voting keys. Each
time a given node A forms a connection with some node B, A broadcasts its
voting key for B and vice-versa. Each node can thus track the degree of all
m of the nodes which share pairwise keys with it, and refuse to form new
connections if the degree becomes too large.
2.3 Problems of Distributed Revocation Schemes
based on Voting
In this section we illustrate a few problems that are applicable to all dis-
tributed revocation schemes and not just specifically to the scheme described
earlier.
1. Revocation Vote Authenticity
2. Node replication falls outside the scope of degree counting
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3. Irrevocable nodes
4. Unspecified Revocation Policies
• Unspecified start and end of revocation sessions
• Unspecified Revocation Outcome
• Unspecified Revocation Quotas
2.3.1 Revocation Vote Authenticity:
At the time of forming connections each node transmits the voting key (in
clear) of the node with which it forms a connection. For example if node #2
and node #3 were to form connections, node #2 would transmit the voting
key that could be eventually used for revoking node #3. Node #3 does the
same in the context of node #2. The prospective neighbors of node #2 and
node #3 (and any node in the neighborhood; i.e., node #5, node #7 and node
#8)can thus hear this vote in clear.
Suppose as shown in Figure 2.3, a node #8 that is not a prospective neigh-
bor of node #4, makes a copy of this voting key KV3−2 (node #3’s voting key
for revocation of node #2) at the time of connection establishment between
node #2 and node #3. Now node #8 can broadcast a vote against node #3.
The other voting members have a no way of distinguishing a legitimate vote
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Figure 2.3: Lack of revocation vote authenticity: Any node in the neighborhood can
hear another node’s voting key.
(i.e., from a voting member) from that of vote forged by any node in the
neighborhood, such as node #8. We illustrate this in Figure 2.4.
Hence an adversary can collect t votes against any target node of choice
at the time of connection establishment and replay them later to revoke the
target node without the participation of t valid voting members.
Problem Summary: A node receiving a vote cannot ascertain a vote’s source
with certainty.
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Figure 2.4: Lack of revocation vote authenticity: Any node in the neighborhood can
cast a legitimate vote pretending to be some other node.
2.3.2 Node Replication Falls Outside the Scope of Node-
Degree Counting in Neighborhoods
Nodes in a neighborhood can keep track of another node’s degree (i.e., per-
form neighborhood degree counting) by counting the voting keys of a prospec-
tive neighbor at the time of connection establishment. If the degree of any
node requesting a connection is equal to an upper limit dmax, the other nodes
refuse to form connections with the node whose degree has reached the max-
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Figure 2.5: Adversary captures node 3 in neighborhood 1, copies its key ring, introduces
new nodes with copy of node 3 key ring in the other neighborhoods. With a single node
capture, an adversary circumvents the intent of degree counting mechanism
imum allowed value (dmax). This prevents nodes from replicating in a neigh-
borhood. However, an adversary can still launch a replication attack despite
neighborhood degree counting. Suppose an adversary captures a node # i, he
copies the key-ring of node# i and introduces new sensor nodes with the key
ring of node# i in other neighborhoods. Nodes in other neighborhoods cannot
perform global degree tracking as most communications can be heard only
within the neighborhood of a node. Hence, counting node degrees within the
21
neighborhood of a node is insufficient to detect node replication. Figure 2.5
shows the above scenario.
Problem Summary: With a single node capture an adversary can replicate
in multiple neighborhoods without detection.
2.3.3 Irrevocable Nodes
Figure 2.6: Node 4 colludes with node 2(degree of node 2 =t)to revoke node 3 => after
revocation, node 2 becomes irrevocable (< t neighbors)
To revoke a target node (using voting), at least t votes have to be heard
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against the target node. Suppose, nodes #4 and #2 are voting members of
a node #3. The degree of node #2 is t. Now nodes #4 and#2 can collude to
revoke node#3. This would make node #2 irrevocable as the degree of node
#2 is now t-1 (after revoking node#3) and at least t votes are needed to revoke
a sensor node.
Problem Summary: In any threshold based voting scheme there needs to
be a way to prevent nodes in the network from falling below threshold.
2.3.4 Unspecified Revocation Policies
Unspecified start and end of revocation sessions
• Nodes participating in a revocation session do not know when to stop
counting votes. This may imply an indefinite wait time for a vote.
• If multiple voting sessions are introduced, voting members have no
authentic way of determining whether a voting session has been started
off by a legitimate voting member or by an adversary who simply wants
to collect voting keys to replay later.
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Figure 2.7: Unspecified start and end of revocation sessions: (1) Node 2 does not know
when to stop counting votes. This leads to an infinite waiting time. (2) As nodes cannot
verify the authenticity of a ‘Start Voting’ message.An adversary could start off a voting
session to collect voting keys to replay later.
Unspecified Revocation Outcome
Suppose a revocation session against a target node fails, meaning that only
g votes have been heard and g < t. In the future, t voting members may
be prepared to vote against the same target node. Hence there needs to be
in place a provision for multiple voting sessions to enable multiple voting
attempts against a target node. This may not be possible with voting keys
24
that are already made public in the first voting session.
Figure 2.8: Flowchart illustrating the lack of a well specified revocation outcome
Unspecified Revocation Quotas
There has to be a ceiling limit on the number of nodes a particular node can
revoke. This is required as a node# i could attempt to revoke its neighbors
to such an extant that in the future the membership of the node# i falls
below the threshold t meaning that the node# i is now irrevocable. If a node
25
Figure 2.9: Example scenario: Suppose the threshold is t = 4. Suppose node 3
helps/manages to get node 2 revoked and over a period of time gets nodes 7,1 revoked
too. As degree of node 3 ¡ t, node 3 is now irrevocable.
votes against a target node in its neighborhood and the target node is sub-
sequently revoked, then the degree of the voting node decreases. Thus over
a period of time the voting nodes could become irrevocable as their degree
could fall below t. Hence, in any revocation session, it is in the best interest
of participating nodes to revoke the target node even when the target node
is harmless. This is an unintended side effect of threshold-based revocation.
26
Problem Summary: Revocation policy decisions need to specified. For ex-
ample if multiple revocation sessions are supported, they must have a time
bound. There also must be provisions for multiple voting sessions, and con-





In this section we propose a distributed revocation scheme for DSNs based on
threshold cryptography. Threshold cryptography is generally used to divide
data D into n pieces in such a way that D is easily reconstructable from
any k pieces (k ≤ n), but even complete knowledge of k − 1 pieces reveals
absolutely no information about D [2].
3.1 A Distributed Revocation Scheme
Our scheme relies on three cryptographic primitives: (1) hash functions, (2)
random polynomials and (3) authenticated encryption.
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3.1.1 Cryptographic Primitives Used
1.Hash functions
We use the one-way and collision-resistance properties of hash functions.
2.Random Polynomials and their Threshold Keys
We use a random number generator to produce coefficients for polynomials
of degree t. Polynomial q(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x
2 + .... + at−1xt−1 is random
if all its coefficients a0, a1...., at−1 are random uniformly distributed values
in a certain range [0, l − 1] (e.g., l = 264). We define the threshold key of
a random polynomial q(x) to be Kt = hash(a0|a1|....|at−1), where hash is a
hash function and a0, a1, ...., at−1 are the coefficients of q(x). The properties
of the hash function guarantee that: (1) if two random polynomials of the
same degree are distinct (i.e., they differ in at least a coefficient), the prob-
ability that their threshold keys are identical is negligible; and (2) given a
threshold key of a random polynomial, it is computationally unfeasible to
find the coefficients of that polynomial. As their name implies, threshold
keys have a threshold property; i.e., at least t distinct pairs (q(xi), xi) of a
random polynomial are required to compute its threshold key, and any set of
t such pairs will yield the same threshold key. [Note: In our scheme, random
polynomials are computed off-line. If a large number of random polynomials
j, 1 << j < 2l/2, of degree t are needed, they can be constructed efficiently
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from a single random polynomial by setting aij = f(a
j−1
i ), where ai0 = ai




We use authenticated-encryption modes to detect (1) existential forgeries,
and (2) false (or inauthentic) decryption keys (i.e., decryption keys not used
by the corresponding encryption operation), during ciphertext decryption.
Existential Forgeries: Informally, authenticated encryption modes detect
forged ciphertext (i.e., ciphertext not produced by encryption with a given
key) at decryption with very high probability (i.e., probability negligibly close
to one) and return an error.
Key Authenticity: Informally, given a ciphertext produced by an encryption
mode and a random key, a key-authenticity test decides whether that cipher-
text was produced with that key. Authenticated-encryption modes detect
false (or inauthentic) encryption keys with very high probability at decryp-
tion and return an error. In this scheme, we test the authenticity of encrypted
votes and of the session key with which votes are encrypted, using efficient
AE modes. Such modes are widely known [23, 4, 18].
In general, we say that an encryption mode admits a key authenticity test,
if there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that that can distinguish
between a ciphertext and the key it was encrypted with from a ciphertext
and a random key. If the distinction is made with non-negligible (negligibly-
30
close-to-one) probability, the test is called the weak (strong) key authenticity,
or WKA(SKA), test [17]. Another key-authenticity test is provided by the
confusion freedom (CF) property of an encryption mode [10]. That is, if k
and k’ are random keys, then for any plaintext string x in the 3 domain of the
encryption function Ek, Pr[Dk’(Ek(x)) =/= Null] is negligible, where Dk’ is
the decryption function using key k’. Or, decryption of a ciphertext with a
key that differs from the random key used to generate that ciphertext will fail
with probability negligibly close to one. Further, if AE is an authenticated
encryption mode that is secure in an existential unforgeability sense [14],
implications AE => CF => SKA => WKA hold [17]. Hence, the use of
AE modes is sufficient for key authenticity tests.
Notation:
For clarity, we list the symbols used in the section below:
n size of network,
m number of prospective neighbors of a node
t (threshold) number of votes required in a voting session to revoke a
node
s maximum number of revocation sessions allowed against a node
SK session Key for encrypting revocation votes against a target in one
of s sessions
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Kt threshold key of a random polynomial of degree t (used to generate
SK)
Mask session Mark received from the target node for session activation
H hash(Mask) used to verify the value of session Mask received from
target node
∆t maximum duration of a revocation session
3.1.2 Off-line Node Initialization
First, we compute s random polynomials of degree t for each of the n nodes in
the network, where s is the number of revocation sessions (attempts) against
any node in the network. (For example, if the size of the sensor network is n
= 10,000 and the number of revocation sessions is s = 6, this would require
60,000 polynomials of degree t .)
Second, we (1) generate a session key (SK) for each revocation session
against a target node and mask it by xor-ing each it with a separate per-
session Mask; (2) load the result of the xor in each of the target’s potential
neighbor nodes and each Mask in the target node; and (3) load the values of
H = hash(Mask) to each potential neighbor node of the target node. (The
hash value, H enables each neighbor to verify the validity of each session’s
Mask received from a target node whenever a revocation session is activated;
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viz., discussion in section3.1.3). Each SK is generated by encrypting a ran-
dom 64-bit number in the threshold key Kt = hash(a0|a1|....|at−1) associated
with a session’s random polynomial, using an AE mode. (Note that a sep-
arate SK corresponds to each of the s random polynomials of a node.) SK
is recovered upon session activation by xor-ing the masked session key with
the session Mask.
Third, for each of the m >> t neighbors of a target node and each of
the s revocation sessions against that target, we compute a vote that is
represented as the tuple (q(xi), xi), where q(xi) is the value of a session’s
polynomial at x = xi for that session. Each vote is associated with the other
revocation-session parameters (e.g., SK and hash(Mask)) and loaded into the
corresponding node. Further, each of the m >> t neighbors of a revocation
target receives a value ∆t, which represents the duration of a revocation
session. (The value of ∆t value is arrived at using network characteristics
and computational power of sensor nodes.) In summary, the quantities are
computed off-line and pre-loaded in nodes are:
1. Computed: s*n polynomials of degree t , keys Kt, keys SK and hash(SK);
2. Pre-loaded in each node: s*m votes, SK ⊕ Mask values, hash(Mask)
values, other Node’s Masks, and a ∆t value.
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3.1.3 Activation of a Revocation Session
A session becomes active upon receipt of an authentic revocation vote by any
of the local neighbors of a target node. An authentic vote is encrypted in
the SK of that session. To ensure that only the actual (i.e., local, as opposed
to all) neighbors of a target node can revoke that node, the SK ⊕ Mask,
instead of SKs are pre-loaded into neighbor nodes. Each local neighbor node
obtains the session Mask from the target node, either as a result of connec-
tion establishment or later as a result of a direct request to the target node.
A neighbor node receives a Mask encrypted in the pairwise shared key with
the target node. The neighbor node decrypts the Mask and verifies its value
by computing its hash and comparing the result against the stored value
H = hash(Mask) of that session, and then xors the Mask with SK ⊕Mask
to obtain the session key SK. Nodes exchange Masks after connection es-
tablishment for an initial revocation session against each other [CPS03]. If
a revocation session against a target node fails, each neighbor requests the
activation of a new session and corresponding Mask from the target node.
Up to s sessions can be activated against a target node. If the target node
refuses to activate the session and does not return the session Mask within
a fixed interval of time, revocation of that node is automatic.
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3.1.4 Revocation Commit and Target Revocation
The revocation decision is made only by the actual (local) neighbors of a tar-
get node, and requires that at least t neighbors’ vote, and that a neighbor’s
vote cannot be forged/reused/replayed in the same or any other revocation
session. To revoke any target node during a session, t votes (q(xi), xi) en-
crypted in the SK for that session must be cast and heard by that target’s
neighbors. The coefficients a0, a1...at−1 are computed by every voting node
from the first t votes heard. Once the coefficients are computed, the key
Kt can be derived and the session’s SK decrypted with Kt. Since SK de-
cryption is performed using an authenticated encryption mode, if the SK
decrypts correctly, then key Kt is correct (with probability negligibly close
to one), which means that t participants must have voted and the votes are
not replays (Revocation Commit). Then, each voting member deletes the
key of the target node from its key ring (Target Revocation). Note that if
fewer than t legitimate votes would be cast and some replayed to reach the
threshold t , a key K ′t = / = Kt would be produced and decryption of SK
using an AE mode would fail with very high probability.
If t authentic votes haven’t been heard within ∆t, the revocation session
against a target node would fail. This means the voting session has expired
and all the participants delete the votes heard (for the failed session). A new
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Mask from the target node is requested for the next revocation session.
3.1.5 Propagation and Global Verification of Local Re-
vocation Commit
After a revocation decision is made in a neighborhood, each neighborhood
node transmits the sessions Kt and Mask in clear to other nodes outside the
neighborhood to reach all potential neighbors of a revoked node. This avoids
replication attacks by adversary in new neighborhoods). A node receiving
transmission of Mask, Kt verifies the Mask by checking that hash(Mask) =
H and then unmasks SK⊕Mask to obtain the session key SK. If Kt decrypts
SK correctly, the key corresponding to the revoked node is deleted and the
message Mask, Kt broadcast to other nodes.
The base station listens to the message Mask,Kt broadcasted in any
neighborhood in the network. The base station then deletes the keys shared
by undeployed nodes with the target node. This way an adversary cannot





In this section we define the few key notions and state the properties of our
revocation scheme. We then proceed to argue the correctness of these prop-
erties using the implementation details of our revocation scheme, presented
in chapter 3. This way, we evaluate the new scheme and its robustness in the
context of the various problems relating to distributed revocation (discussed
in chapter 2). We then list the problems that have not been addressed by
the new scheme. That is, we discuss why tracking the degree of nodes in a
DSN is a difficult problem and its role in solving the distributed revocation
problem.
4.1 Definitions
Definition 1: (Target) A node to be revoked is called a target.
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Definition 2: (Participant) A participant in the revocation protocol is
any node that has a shared key with a target node.
Definition 3: (Vote Authenticity) Given a set of participants that vote,
we say that a vote is authentic if the vote (a) is cast only by a participant,
(b) is not forged, and (c) is not a replay of another vote.
Definition 4: (Revocation Commit ) Given a threshold t and a set
of m participants, m >> t, we say that revocation is committed when any
set of t authentic votes is heard (recorded) by any of the participants.
Definition 5: (Target Revocation) A target is revoked when all m par-
ticipants (a) verify revocation commitment, and (b) delete their keys shared
with that target.
Definition 6: (Non-blocking Revocation) A revocation protocol is non-
blocking if a non-participant, target or non-local participant node cannot
block revocation.
Note 1: If a revocation policy is implemented, then we can provide a re-
vocation outcome in bounded time; i.e., we bound a revocation session by a
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start time and a stop time within which participants have to decide whether
to commit or not. In the presence of revocation sessions, there is a provi-
sion for failure outcome in a revocation session. In a revocation session, the
outcome could either be a success (target node revoked) or a failure (target
node not revoked).
Definition 7: (Revocation Session) A revocation session is defined by
the following parameters:
(a) a session VOTE-START time that marks the receipt of the first authentic
vote by a participant;
(b) a session VOTE-STOP time that is defined by VOTE-START +∆t,
where ∆t is the maximum duration of a session;
(c) a set of votes that are unique to that session;
(d) an outcome (success/failure) for that session:
• a Failure outcome, which implies the condition: (Participant Clock =
Stop-Vote and number of authentic votes received < t) or (Revocation
Commit Message is not heard (received)).
• a Success outcome is target revocation
Note 2: In the presence of a revocation policy and provisions for failure out-
come, it is implied that we allow session retries. This, in turn implies we
39
must have the notion of a session number (needed to identify a session) and
a limit to the number of new revocation sessions allowed against the target
node.
Note 3: The notion of local participants along with a revocation policy, means
that the revocation outcome of a session is local.
Definition 8: (Locality of Revocation Sessions) The outcome of a revoca-
tion session against a target is conducted by m′ < m local participants and
the outcome of that session is transmitted to all (non-local) participants.
4.2 Properties of Revocation :
Property 1: If a target node is revoked, then at least t local participants
voted to revoke and all t votes must have been authentic.
Proof Sketch: By definitions 4 and 5, if a target is revoked, m >> t partic-
ipants verified revocation commitment and it means that t authentic votes
have been heard (recorded) by any of the participants. However, by defini-
tion 3, vote authenticity requires that only local participants can cast votes,
the votes can be neither forged nor replayed.
• At least t local participants must vote to revoke: There must exist at
least t local participants; i.e., at the time of deployment, if a node has
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fewer than t neighbors, it self-destructs. Then, by definition 5, target
revocation implies revocation commit and by definition 4, at least t
local participants must have voted to revoke.
• Only local participants can cast votes: Only the local participants of
a node can recover a SK for a given session since the Masks received
from the target node are encrypted in the pairwise shared keys. Hence
only local participants can cast votes.
• Votes cannot be forged: Votes are encrypted with the SK for that ses-
sion. This means that only votes cast by local participants decrypt
correctly in an AE mode using SK. A local participant cannot forge
another local participant’s vote (i.e., the vote of a local participant
who decided not to vote for revocation), since it would not be able to
compute a valid vote other than its own. That is, a local participant
could not compute the coefficients of a session’s random polynomial
from fewer than t(q(xi), xi) values.
• Votes cannot be replayed:
– a. Votes cannot be replayed within a voting session: If any of
the t voted are duplicates, the threshold key K ′t obtained would
correspond to a polynomial of a lower degree t′ < t. Hence, K ′t =
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/ = K ′t and decryption of SK in an AE mode with K
′
t would fail.
– b. Votes cannot be replayed across voting sessions: We use differ-
ent SKs for different sessions. Hence, decryption of a SK ′ = / =
SK of the current session in an AE mode with Kt would fail.
Property 2: Target revocation is a unitary (i.e., all or nothing) action.
Proof Sketch: By definition 2, participants are nodes that have a shared
key with the target node. Some of the participants may either be currently
deployed in the sensor network or may be deployed by the base station in the
future. By definition 4, revocation commit implies that any participant has
heard t authentic votes. By definition 5, target revocation implies that all m
(deployed and undeployed) participants have verified revocation commitment
and deleted shared keys with the target node.
• If a node has been revoked in a neighborhood, then at least one of the
local participants has used t authentic votes to arrive at Kt and has
unmasked SK. This participant broadcasts the message Mask,Kt in
clear. All local participants delete their shared key with target node.
• Nodes that can hear the broadcast Mask,Kt, re-broadcast this message
further. This message reaches other neighborhoods (other than the
neighborhood in which the target node was revoked).
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Target revocation by participants deployed in the network:
• Participants of the target node that may be present in other neighbor-
hoods can verify Mask against the pre-stored hash(Mask), unmask the
SK (with Mask in message) and can try decrypting the SK with the
key Kt in the transmission.
• If Kt decrypts the SK (i.e., the SK is valid), then participants in other
neighborhoods delete the shared key with the target node. Now, the
target node cannot form connections with any participant in the net-
work.
Target revocation by undeployed participants:
• The base station can also listen to the broadcast Mask,Kt from any
neighborhood. The base station can verify Mask against the pre-stored
hash(Mask), unmask the SK (with Mask in message) and can try de-
crypting the SK with the key Kt in the transmission.
• If Kt decrypts the SK (i.e., the SK is valid), then the base station
deletes the keys shared by undeployed nodes with the revoked node.
Now, the target node cannot form connections with any participant
that may be deployed into the network in the future.
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Property 3: The target revocation protocol is non-blocking.
Proof Sketch: Definition 8 implies that only a local participant can influence
the revocation decision. Only the target, non-participant and non-local par-
ticipant nodes block revocation against a target node and by design, there
are intuitively only two ways these nodes could possibly block the protocol;
i.e., within a revocation session by forcing local participants to compute the
wrong Kt within revocation session or by exhausting the number of revoca-
tion sessions against a target node.
Claim 3.1:Target, non-participant, and non-local participant nodes cannot
block target revocation by forcing local participants to compute wrong Kt
within a revocation session.
• Only local participants can unmask SK from Mask and SK ⊕Mask.
An authentic vote is encrypted in SK in the AE mode. Target node
knows only the Mask and does not have the SK ⊕Mask. Hence, the
target node cannot cast an authentic vote without the knowledge of
SK.
• Non-participant nodes do not have SK ⊕ Mask (pre-distributed to
all participants) and Mask (distributed only to local participants by
the target node using shared keys) and thus, do not have SK. Hence,
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non-participant nodes cannot cast an authentic vote without obtaining
SK.
• Participants outside a neighborhood cannot obtain the SK by unmask-
ing their SK⊕Mask without the Mask, which is available only within
a local neighborhood (Mask distributed only to local participants by
the target node using shared keys). Hence, non-local participant nodes
cannot cast an authentic vote without unmasking SK.
Any target, non-participant and non-local participant node cannot cast
authentic votes and hence, these nodes cannot cast votes that do not com-
pute the correct Kt (for a given revocation session), and consequently, block
the revocation of the target node.
Claim 3.2: Target, non-participant, and non-local participant nodes cannot
block target revocation by exhausting sessions.
By Claim 3.1, any target, non-participant and non-local participant node
cannot block the target revocation protocol by forcing local participants to
compute wrong Kt. Thus, these nodes cannot exhaust the maximum num-
ber of sessions allowed against a target node, by forcing local participants to
repeatedly compute the wrong Kt for each separate session.
Note: The target revocation is blocking if a malicious participant leaks the
key SK to other nodes (both participants and non-participants). In that
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case, any node can cast invalid votes that compute the incorrect kt, and con-
sequently block revocation of the target node. However, Property 3 does not
claim to associate the non-blocking property with participants. The above
attack is feasible only when a participant decides to block target revocation
and thus, is beyond the scope of Property 3. However, this problem can be
solved by loading the hash values of legitimate votes into the participants
before deployment. This way, a participant can differentiate between a valid
vote that computes the correct kt and an invalid vote. Chan, Perrig and
Song proposed a similar scheme [12] using Merkle hash trees[19] to address
this problem.
Property 4: A revocation decision is made in bounded time.
Proof Sketch: By definition 7, revocation sessions are finite and also, failure
outcome in a revocation session implies that there are multiple revocation
sessions. Also, there are finite number of attempts to revoke a target node
within which the participants must arrive at a revocation decision.
• If Revocation session fails then, each participant requests a new Mask
from the target node to unmask a new SK for the next revocation
session.
• If the number of revocation sessions is greater than session-retry Limit
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then the number of attempts to revoke the target node have been ex-
hausted and a new mask (to unmask a new SK) is not available to the
participants for revoking the target node.
Property 5: If revocation commit is verified by all participants, replication
of a revoked node outside its neighborhood is not possible.
Proof Sketch: By definition 8 and 5 any participant in the network (other
than in an actual neighborhood) can verify a local revocation commit and
can delete shared-keys with the revoked node.
• If a node has been revoked in a neighborhood, at least one of the local
participants has arrived at Kt using t authentic votes and has unmasked
SK. This participant broadcasts the message Mask,Kt in clear.
• Nodes that can hear this message, re-broadcast this message further.
This message reaches other neighborhoods (other than the neighbor-
hood in which the target node was revoked).
• Non-local participants of the target node that may be present in other
neighborhoods can verify Mask against the pre-stored hash(Mask), un-
mask the SK (with Mask in message) and can try decrypting the SK
with the key Kt in the transmission.
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• If Kt decrypts the SK (i.e., the SK is valid), then participants in other
neighborhoods delete the shared key with the target node. Now, an
adversary cannot introduce a revoked node (its key ring) in new neigh-
borhoods.
4.3 Problems not Addressed by the Distributed
Revocation Scheme
The following three problems are not addressed by the new scheme:
1. Node-degree tracking
2. Irrevocable nodes
3. Enforcing quotas for the number of allowed revocations
If a solution to problem 1 is found, then solutions to problems 2 and 3 are
immediate. To solve problem 2 (irrevocable nodes) it is necessary to establish
the degree of a node in an authentic manner, since a node would refuse to
cast a vote against a target node if there is a voting member with degree =
t in the neighborhood of the target node. Hence, solving problem 2 implies
solving problem 1. This would consequently limit the number of revocations
any node can effect; i.e., problem 3 (enforcing quotas) would be solved. Thus
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solving problem 3 implies solving problem 2 implies solving problem 1. De-
gree tracking could either be done in a centralized or a distributed fashion.
In either case, the verification of the degree of any node in the neighborhood
would have to be done at any point of time, not just at deployment.
If the neighborhood would be fully connected, degree tracking could be
implemented in a distributed manner. A fully connected neighborhood would
mean any node could communicate in an authentic manner with any other
node. Hence, there is a trustworthy connection between any two nodes in
the neighborhood. This means there a need for an elaborate key distribution
scheme would not arise, and revocation would only involve authenticated
exchange of messages between nodes. However, establishing fully connected
neighborhoods is a challenging problem in itself considering the memory over-
head needed in storing that many keys/node to establish a fully connected
neighborhood.
Another solution could be to use a centralized lookup of the degree of a
node of interest. In that case, the centralized node that counts the degree
would need to update the degrees of nodes periodically. This would mean
that degree tracking might becomes a challenge in itself whenever revoca-
tion is distributed. This is the case because the centralized node in-charge
of degree tracking might not be aware of which nodes would be revoked. If
this centralized node would have to be informed of revocations in an authen-
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tic manner, the line between centralized and distributed revocation would
be blurred. Also, in such a scenario centralized revocation would become
faster than distributed revocation as now, a centralized mechanism for de-




5.1 Conclusions and future work:
The notion of revocation in sensor networks differs significantly from revok-
ing entities in other common networks such as the internet. As public key
cryptography solutions are not viable in DSNs and due to their mobile ad
hoc nature, revocation of sensor nodes in DSNs is a particularly challeng-
ing problem. Revocation in sensor networks can either be centralized or
distributed.
We discussed a centralized revocation scheme proposed by Eschenauer
and Gligor [16], and identified problems with centralized revocation. We
also discussed a distributed revocation scheme proposed by Chan, Perrig, and
Song [12]. We illustrated some of the complexity of distributed revocation
using this scheme and concluded that much of the complexity illustrated
holds for all distributed revocation schemes, and not just for this scheme.
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We then presented a distributed revocation scheme for DSNs using threshold
cryptography. We finally evaluated the scheme by stating properties and
arguing their correctness. In future work, we propose to extend the algorithm
to address the problem of node degree tracking. As observed in chapter 4,
solving the node degree tracking problem would automatically solve the other
problems identified with distributed revocation schemes.
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